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Beginning with Benhabib and Farmer (1994), Farmer and Guo (1994) and
Gal￿ (1994) to name just three, a large body of work now exists in which
a standard real business cycle model is modi￿ed to generate indeterminate
equilibria driven by sunspot shocks. The two central mechanisms that pro-
duce this indeterminacy result are increasing returns to scale technologies
and countercyclical markups. While the existence of scale economies has un-
dergone much empirical testing, empirical work on the aggregate markup￿ s
behavior over the business cycle remains less evolved. Moreover, Nekarda and
Ramey (2010) suggest that markups in the US are procyclical or acyclical.
Hence, the Nekarda-Ramey ￿ndings put doubt on the plausibility of endoge-
nous business cycle models that build on countercyclical markups.1 The
current paper addresses this issue by laying out an arti￿cial economy that is
susceptible to endogenous business cycles even if markups are procyclical.
Speci￿cally, we investigate the roles of taste for variety and the composi-
tion of aggregate demand in a general equilibrium economy with endogenous
entries and exits of monopolistically competitive ￿rms.2 These ￿rms supply
di⁄erentiated intermediate goods that are used in the production of ￿nal con-
sumption goods and investment goods. The technologies of assembling the
two ￿nal goods di⁄er, hence, the composition of demand a⁄ects the degree
of market power of the monopolistic ￿rms. At this stage, the model resem-
bles Schmitt-GrohØ (1997) and Gal￿ (1994). However, we are able to show
that endogenous net business formation eliminates the existence of sunspot
equilibria. For these equilibria to re-emerge, we introduce taste for variety.
Variety e⁄ects connote the idea that a greater number of di⁄erentiated prod-
ucts enhances e¢ ciency.3 A rise in product variety then leads to a fall in
1The ￿nding is not uncontroversial and Rotemberg and Woodford (1999), for example,
claim that markups are countercyclical.
2The procyclicality of ￿rm entry and its implications for the business cycle has been
discussed by Chatterjee and Cooper (1993), Devereux, Head and Lapham (1996), and
more recently by Jaimovich (2007) who also o⁄ers empirical support.
3Our formulation of the variety e⁄ect (aka love of variety, variety gains, increasing
returns to variety, returns to specialization) follows Benassy (1996) as it allows to separate
the e⁄ect from the elasticity of substitution.
2aggregate prices (relative to the price of intermediate goods) or equivalently
to an endogenous rise in the e¢ ciency wedge, which can be interpreted as
a rise in productivity. If the taste for variety is su¢ ciently large (in a well
de￿ned way) then economic ￿ uctuations can be driven by self-ful￿lling be-
liefs. Moreover, we show that these belief shocks generate arti￿cial business
cycles that resemble empirically observed ￿ uctuations. Returning to Nekarda
and Ramey￿ s (2010) ￿ndings, arti￿cial markups can be either procyclical or
countercyclical. In fact, we identify situations where procyclical markups (in
the empirically plausible range) make indeterminacy easier to obtain.
Several studies a¢ rm the presence of variety e⁄ects. This empirical evi-
dence includes Funke and Ruhwedel (2001) who report a positive relationship
between an index of product variety and per capita income. Feenstra and Kee
(2008) and Feenstra (2010) ￿nd similar e⁄ects in the trade context. Ardelean
(2009) estimates consumer￿ s love for variety and suggests that variety mat-
ters for both imported and domestically produced goods. Drescher, Thiele
and Weiss (2008) present evidence on consumers￿preferences for variety in
food consumption. While these authors aver the presence of variety e⁄ects,
we cannot pan a general agreement on point estimates. Hence, we do not
calibrate our arti￿cial economy to such an estimate, rather, our strategy is
to ferret out indeterminacy situations that require this e⁄ect to be as small
as possible.
The economic mechanism that concocts the indeterminacy is easily un-
derstood in terms of the equilibrium wage-hour locus: expectations about the
future turn out to be self-ful￿lling if this locus is upwardly sloping. Techno-
logically increasing returns are not the reason for the positive slope. Instead,
a combination of taste for variety and changes of the markup delivers this
result. With a constant number of ￿rms, a countercyclical markup leads to
a procyclical e¢ ciency wedge and thus can give rise to an upwardly sloping
wage-hour locus. In this case, a countercyclical e¢ ciency wedge due a pro-
cyclical markup cannot give rise to indeterminacy. However, in the presence
of positive variety e⁄ects, endogenous ￿rm entry and exit implies that an
increase in the number of ￿rms leads to an increase in productivity. Then a
procyclical markup, despite itself lowering the e¢ ciency wedge, can induce
3greater ￿rm entry. Alternatively, a countercyclical markup improves the e¢ -
ciency wedge, but has a negative impact on ￿rm entry. In reduced form, these
work like increasing returns at the aggregate level, and hence, the wage-hour
locus can become upwardly sloping.
Related work includes Benhabib and Farmer (1994), Farmer and Guo
(1994) and Wen (1998) who show that technological increasing returns lead
to sunspot equilibria in real business cycle models. However, these authors
rely on declining marginal costs, which does not receive empirical support.4
Schmitt-GrohØ (1997), Weder (2000), and Jaimovich (2007) lay out models
that generate indeterminacy through countercyclical markups.5 Seegmuller
(2007) and Chang, Hung and Huang (2011) show that taste for variety can be
the source of sunspot equilibria. Seegmuller (2007) argues this in an overlap-
ping generations model with constant markups. Markups are also constant
in Chang et al. (2011) who additionally assume production externalities,
i.e. declining marginal costs. To our knowledge, Gal￿￿ s (1994) composition
of demand model is the only model in which indeterminacy can result due
to procyclical markups. However, his model then entails a countercyclical
investment share and requires markups that are outside of the empirically
plausible range.
The rest of this paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 lays out the model.
Section 3 analyzes the local dynamics. Variable capital utilization is intro-
duced in Section 4. Section 5 checks robustness regarding the formulation
of the variety e⁄ect. Simulations are presented in Section 6. Section 7 con-
cludes.
2 Model
The arti￿cial economy is based on the composition of aggregate demand
model laid out by Schmitt-GrohØ (1997) and originally put forth by Gal￿
(1994). Each intermediate good ￿rm produces a di⁄erentiated intermediate
4For example, see Basu and Fernald (1997).
5See also Dos Santos Ferreira and Dufourt (2006) as well as Dos Santos Ferreira and
Lloyd-Braga (2008).
4good and acts as a monopolist competitor for this good. These goods are
bought by a ￿nal sector that welds them together into two di⁄erent ￿nal
goods. One ￿nal good is consumed, while the other increases the capital
stock. Monopolistic competitors cannot price-discriminate between the con-
sumption and investment related demands, hence, the composition of demand
a⁄ects their market power. Our model di⁄ers from Schmitt-GrohØ (1997) and
Gal￿ (1994) in two important ways. First, the number of intermediate good
varieties, Nt, is endogenously determined each period: free entry takes place
up to the point where the zero pro￿t condition holds. Empirically, zero or
close to zero pure pro￿ts seem to be a reasonable assumption. Second, we
allow for variety e⁄ects. These e⁄ects imply that net business formation in-
duces productivity increases. Unlike other work on indeterminacy, including
Chang et al. (2011), the only source of technological increasing returns are
￿xed costs to operate the ￿rms. Time evolves continuously. We will begin
with the presentation of the economy￿ s technology.
2.1 Firms
The ￿nal goods sector is perfectly competitive and produces the ￿nal con-
sumption good, Ct and the ￿nal investment good, Xt. The production func-



























￿ ￿ 0;￿ 2 (0;1)
where yi;c;t (yi;x;t) stands for the amount of the unique intermediate good i
used in manufacturing consumption (investment) goods. The speci￿c func-
tional form implies constant elasticities of substitution between intermediate
goods equal to 1=(1 ￿ ￿) and 1=(1 ￿ ￿). Parameters ! and ￿ govern the
strength of the variety e⁄ects, which are absent when ! = 0 and ￿ = 0.
Our formulation follows Benassy (1996): the variety e⁄ect is independent of
the elasticity of substitution parameters ￿ and ￿: Intermediate good produc-
ers are not able to price discriminate regardless of whether their goods will
5be used in the production of consumption or investment goods, thus, they
charge the identical price pi;t to both demands (see also Gal￿, 1994). Then,
the conditional demand for intermediate good i to be used in the production










































Intermediate goods are produced using capital, ki;t, and labor, hi;t, both sup-
plied on perfectly competitive factor markets. Each ￿rm i produces according





i;t ￿ ￿ 0 < ￿ < 1;￿ > 0 (3)
where ￿ stands for ￿xed overhead costs. The presence of ￿ implies internal
increasing returns to scale. Each monopolist faces demands (1) and (2) and










The implicit demands for labor and capital are
￿i;t
pi;t

















6where wt is the wage and rt is the rental rate earned by agents for their labor
and capital services. Free entry into the intermediate goods sector leads to
zero pro￿ts (net of ￿xed costs) for each active ￿rm in every period. Entry and
exit decisions are static and simply depend on the current period￿ s pro￿ts.
We restrict our analysis to a symmetric equilibrium where all monopolists
produce the same amount and charge the same price. Therefore, yi;c;t+yi;x;t =
yi;t = yt, ki;t = kt, hi;t = ht, ￿i;t = ￿t, pi;t = pt and aggregate capital and
hours are Kt = Ntkt and Ht = Ntht. When choosing the consumption good








Pt moves with the number of ￿rms if the variety e⁄ects in ￿nal goods di⁄er.
If ! = ￿, the relative price remains constant. Using (3), (4), and (5) with














The e¢ ciency wedge, PtN￿
t =￿t; is therefore a positive function of the relative
price and the number of ￿rms and it is negatively related to the markup. The


















Then the optimal markup can be rewritten as a function of this share
￿t =
1
1￿￿(1 ￿ st) + 1
1￿￿st
1
1￿￿(1 ￿ st) + 1
1￿￿st ￿ 1
:
7The price elasticity of demand is given by 1
￿￿1(1 ￿ st) + 1
￿￿1st. Note that
when ￿ = ￿ the markup is constant. If ￿ > ￿ the markup is procyclical
to st, then a shift in demand from consumption to investment means that
each monopolist faces a more inelastic demand curve and this leads to a rise
in the markup. We restrict the markup elasticity, "￿ ￿ (@￿=@s)(s=￿), to








where ￿ and s are the steady state values of the markup and the investment
share.6
2.2 Agents





￿￿tu(Ct;Ht)dt ￿ > 0
where ￿ denotes the subjective discount rate. Period utility takes on the
functional form
u(Ct;Ht) = lnCt ￿ ￿Ht ￿ > 0:
Labor is indivisible. This assumption keeps solutions analytically tractable
and it allows us to compare our results to existing work on sunspot equilibria.7
The agent owns the capital stock and sells labor and capital services. He owns
all ￿rms and receives any (potential) pro￿ts, ￿t, generated by them. Then,
the representative agent￿ s budget is constrained by
wtHt + rtKt + ￿t ￿ PtXt + Ct:
Capital accumulation follows
_ Kt = Xt ￿ ￿Kt 0 < ￿ < 1:
6Under indeterminacy and in the absence of changes to fundamentals, when "￿ > 0
("￿ < 0), the markup is also procyclical (countercyclical) with respect to output. See
Appendix 8.1.
7Yet, extensions are straightforward.
8Here, time derivatives are denoted by dots and ￿ stands for the constant rate
















where ￿ is the current value multiplier. Equations (6) and (7) describe the
agent￿ s leisure-consumption trade-o⁄, while (8) is the intertemporal Euler
equation. In addition the usual transversality condition holds.
3 Dynamics
Next we analyze the local dynamical property of the arti￿cial economy. In
particular, we take a log-linear approximation to the equilibrium conditions.









Hatted variables denote percent deviations from their steady-state values and
J is the 2 ￿ 2 Jacobian matrix of partial derivatives. Note that ￿t is a non-
predetermined variable and that Kt is predetermined. Hence, indeterminacy
requires that the two roots of J to be negative, or simply DetJ > 0 >TrJ.
3.1 Constant markup
We ￿rst consider the case where the markup is constant, meaning that ￿ =
1=￿ = 1=￿ and "￿ = 0. Then, the determinant of J is given by
(1 ￿ ￿(1 + ￿))(￿ + ￿)(￿(1 ￿ ￿) + ￿)
￿[￿(1 ￿ ￿) ￿ ￿)]
and the trace of J equals
￿￿ + ￿￿(1 + ￿)
￿ ￿ ￿(1 ￿ ￿)
:
9Note that the markup, ￿, as well as the variety e⁄ect in the assembling
of consumption goods, !, are completely absent here, hence, they have no
e⁄ect on the stability of the steady state.8 Indeterminacy is driven by the
variety e⁄ect in investment alone. Since indeterminacy requires a positive
determinant and a negative trace, it must be that ￿(1 ￿ ￿) > ￿.9




In the absence of a variety e⁄ect, ￿ = 0, DetJ = ￿(1 ￿ ￿)(￿ + ￿)(￿(1 ￿
￿)+￿)￿2 < 0 and TrJ =￿, thus, the possibility of indeterminacy disappears.
Lemma 1 If "￿ = 0 and ￿ = 0, then indeterminacy cannot arise.
The condition for indeterminacy is similar to Benhabib and Farmer (1994)
and rests on an upwardly sloping wage-hour locus now generated by the va-
riety e⁄ect: the minimum returns to variety equal ￿=(1 ￿ ￿) or numerically,
0:428 (with ￿ = 0:3). Figures 1 and 2 show this case along their "￿ = 0-axis.
Note that the ￿rm￿ s internal increasing returns to scale equal ￿ which can be
pushed towards unity without a⁄ecting the indeterminacy condition.10 Thus,
unlike Benhabib and Farmer (1994) and others, indeterminacy is possible in
the absence of decreasing marginal costs and at essentially zero increasing
returns to scale at the ￿rm level. Given the very limited evidence of signi￿-
cant returns to scale (e.g. Basu and Fernald, 1994), taste for variety o⁄ers a
potentially more plausible mechanism to generate sunspot equilibria.11 Next,
we allow indeterminacy to arise for smaller values of ￿.
8The second component of this result is reminiscent of Harrison and Weder￿ s (2002)
￿ndings for two-sector models; the increasing returns originating in the consumption goods
sector are irrelevant for the stability of the steady state.
9We restrict ￿(1 + ￿) < 1 to rule out endogenous growth.
10In fact, market power has no e⁄ect on dynamics. This is due to the instantaneous
adjustment to zero pro￿ts (also see Kim, 2004).
11This being said, existing empirical work on variety e⁄ects is sparse and we do not have
good point estimates yet, and therefore we abstain for this reason to make any suggestion
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Figure 1: ￿ < 1 + ￿=(1 ￿ ￿):
3.2 Variable Markup
We now consider variable markups, that is "￿ 6= 0. Then, the determinant of
J equals
￿(￿ ￿ 1)(￿(1 ￿ ￿) + ￿)(￿ + ￿)(￿(1 + ￿) ￿ 1)
￿2￿(￿ ￿ 1)(1 + ￿) + ￿￿[￿(1 ￿ ￿) + "￿(1 + ￿ ￿ ￿)] ￿ "￿(￿ + ￿)(1 + ￿ ￿ ￿)
and the matrix￿ s trace is given by
￿￿2￿(￿ ￿ 1)(1 + ￿) + ￿￿[￿￿(￿ ￿ 1) + ￿"￿(1 + ￿ ￿ ￿)] ￿ ￿"￿(￿ + ￿)(1 + ￿ ￿ ￿)
￿2￿(￿ ￿ 1)(1 + ￿) + ￿￿[￿(1 ￿ ￿) + "￿(1 + ￿ ￿ ￿)] ￿ "￿(￿ + ￿)(1 + ￿ ￿ ￿)
:
Again, the variety e⁄ect in consumption, !, does not appear in these ex-
pressions. This suggests that relative price movements have no e⁄ect on
the occurrence of sunspot equilibria, rather, the indeterminacy mechanism
must come from variety e⁄ects and markup variations. Indeterminacy cannot
emerge if there is no variety e⁄ect in investment, i.e. ￿ = 0: a positive de-
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Figure 2: ￿ > 1 + ￿=(1 ￿ ￿):
12TrJ =￿. Phrased alternatively, net business formation eliminates sunspot
equilibria in Schmitt-GrohØ (1997).
Lemma 2 If "￿ 6= 0 and ￿ = 0, then indeterminacy cannot arise.
We plot the stability zones in Figure 1 and 2. In both Figures, the
function that divides the indeterminacy and determinacy regions is given by
"￿ = ￿￿(￿ ￿ 1)(￿ + ￿(￿ ￿ 1))=[(￿(1 ￿ ￿) + ￿)(1 + ￿ ￿ ￿)]. This borderline
is discontinuous at ￿ = ￿ ￿ 1 and this results in two separate indeterminacy
regions if ￿ < 1 + ￿=(1 ￿ ￿). That is, the regions are separate when the
discontinuity occurs at lower variety values than Proposition 1￿ s critical level
of ￿. This situation is plotted in Figure 1, where we denote the two regions
Indeterminacy I and II. The two regions are merged in Figure 2. There are
several important results to this. First, market power now a⁄ects indeter-
minacy. Second, sunspot equilibria arise for procyclical and countercyclical
markups ￿this stands in contrast to Schmitt-GrohØ (1997), Jaimovich (2007)
and others who require countercyclical markups. The result is noteworthy in
light of Nekarda and Ramey￿ s (2010) claim on US markup dynamics. Third,
for ￿ < 1 + ￿=(1 ￿ ￿), the determinacy-indeterminacy borderline is down-
wardly sloping. For indeterminacy region I, this suggests that the minimum
￿ from "￿ = 0 can be reduced by increasing "￿, and in a sense, a more
procyclical markup makes indeterminacy easier to obtain. To move from
determinacy into region II, the (negative) elasticity of the markup has to be
increased. In the empirically less appealing case of ￿ > 1 + ￿=(1 ￿ ￿), the
borderline is upwardly sloping. Here, a larger procyclical "￿ then requires a
stronger variety e⁄ect.
Proposition 2 Indeterminacy appears for procyclical and countercyclical markups.
The economic mechanism that creates the continuum of solutions in our
model is easily understood in reference of the equilibrium wage-hour locus
and an elastic labor supply curve. For example, upon optimistic expectations
about the future, the agent anticipates higher prospective income. Today￿ s
consumption expenditures will rise. As a consequence, the labor supply curve
13shifts inwards. If the wage-hour locus slopes upwardly, employment and in-
vestment will jump up today. The future capital stock, output and consump-
tion will be high and the initial optimistic expectations are self-ful￿lled.
There are essentially two ways to generate an upwardly sloping wage-hour
locus: variety e⁄ects and variable markups. This thought can be organized
via the log-linearized wage-hour locus12
^ wt = (1 + ￿)￿ ^ Kt +
￿
￿(1 ￿ ￿) ￿ ￿ + "￿




Since labor is indivisible, indeterminacy requires the term in front of ^ Ht to
be positive. When is this the case? If "￿ = 0, then ￿(1 ￿ ￿) ￿ ￿ > 0
guarantees indeterminacy as in Proposition 1. If "￿(1+￿￿￿) > 0, then ￿ may
be lowered; the third term in squared brackets is positive and works in the
same direction as the variety e⁄ect. Therefore, a procyclical (countercyclical)
markup endogenously expands the e¢ ciency wedge if ￿ > ￿￿1 (￿ < ￿￿1).
The former is possible because a higher markup induces net ￿rm entry. If the
variety e⁄ect is su¢ ciently large, this entry will dominate the contractionary
clout of a procyclical markup and, in e⁄ect, will work like an improvement of
the e¢ ciency wedge. If ￿ < ￿ ￿ 1, as in region II, indeterminacy arises even
at very low values of ￿. Here, a countercyclical markup leads to a procyclical
e¢ ciency wedge. Next, we show how to decrease minimum ￿ even further.
4 Capital utilization
Section 1 mentioned papers report empirical evidence of variety e⁄ects. How-
ever, there seems to be no general agreement on point estimates, hence, our
strategy is to make the size of the e⁄ect as small as possible. For counter-
cyclical markups, variety e⁄ects can be close to zero. For indeterminacy to
arise with a procyclical markup, we need larger magnitudes. To see this, we
calibrate the model as in Farmer and Guo (1994) and Wen (1998): ￿ = 0:3,
￿ = 0:01; ￿ = 0:025: Then, indeterminacy then requires ￿ > 0:176 in the ex-
treme case where ￿ is close to unity (and hence "￿ is close to zero). This value
12To be precise, here we set ￿ = !:
14can be signi￿cantly reduced by introducing endogenous capital utilization.
To do this, we amend the model such that an intermediate good producer i





and aggregate capital accumulation follows





tKt ￿ > 1
where ut stands for the intensity of capital utilization set by the capital
stock￿ s owners. The rate of depreciation, ￿t, is an increasing function of the
utilization rate. Figures 3 and 4 show numerical indeterminacy regions; the
qualitative pattern parallels the constant utilization model and the source
of sunspot equilibria remains an upwardly sloped wage-hour locus.13 The
constant markup case, "￿ = 0, delivers indeterminacy if ￿ > ￿=(1￿￿+￿=￿) =
0:094. Hence, indeterminacy is independent of ￿ and !; it is driven by
the variety e⁄ect in the investment technology only. When the markup is
variable, "￿ 6= 0, market power again a⁄ects indeterminacy and sunspot
equilibria arise for procyclical and countercyclical markups. In Figure 3,
the steady state markup equals 1:05; which is also the size of ￿rm level
scale economies. At this level of market power, there are two regions of
indeterminacy and for slightly procyclical markups, e.g. the upper limit
"￿ = 0:013, the variety e⁄ect can be as low as 0:072. Figure 4 assumes
￿ = 1:10 which is of magnitude that is commonly assumed in New Keynesian
models. Here, the two indeterminacy regions are merged; analogous to the
constant utilization model, this occurs if ￿ > 1+￿=(1￿￿+￿=￿). Overall, with
the addition of variable capital utilization we have shown that indeterminacy
does not require implausibly high levels of market power and that the size
of the required variety e⁄ects can be signi￿cantly lowered. Before addressing
the business cycle dynamics, we present an alternative formulation of the
variety e⁄ect.
13We provide analytical results in Appendix 8.2.





















Figure 3: Variable capital utilization, ￿ = 1:05:




















Figure 4: Variable capital utilization, ￿ = 1:10:
175 Alternative formulation of variety
Here we demonstrate that our results are robust to the formulation of taste
for variety. So far, we have assumed that the variety e⁄ect does not depend
on the degree of elasticity of substitution as suggested by Benassy (1996).
Chang et al. (2011) and others assume a di⁄erent formulation where the










where the variety e⁄ect, !; is equal to 1=￿ ￿1 > 0. The intuition for setting
the model this way could be that ￿ and ￿ are an indication of product
di⁄erentiation and higher product di⁄erentiation then implies a greater love
for variety. On the other hand, we believe that there is no a priori reason for
assuming such a strong connection between them.
Figure 5 plots the indeterminacy zone for this model with the markup
on the horizontal axis.15 Formulating variety this way does not change our
results: indeterminacy occurs with procyclical and countercyclical markups.
The ￿gure also makes it clear that the production externalities in Chang et
al. (2011) are not required for indeterminacy: if the markup is constant the
su¢ cient condition for indeterminacy is now ￿ > 1=(1 ￿ ￿), which corre-
sponds to Proposition 1￿ s result. If the markup is procyclical, "￿ > 0 (i.e.
￿ > ￿), then ￿min ! 1, albeit in only a small region. Note that at very low
markups there still may be a substantial di⁄erence between ￿ and ￿. There-
fore the variety e⁄ect in investment can still be su¢ ciently large to cause
indeterminacy even if ￿ is very close to unity.16
14Chang et al. (2011) only consider constant markups, ￿ = ￿: See also Devereux et al.
(1996).
15Capital utilization is set as constant.
16This is the reason why we used the more ￿ exible modelling approach in the preceeding
Sections.



















Figure 5: Alternative formulation of variety (constant capital utilization).
6 Business cycle dynamics
We have shown that the taste for variety can generate indeterminacy with
procyclical and countercyclical markups. Although that could be viewed as
progress alone, this remains void as long as these models cannot replicate
at least basic business cycle facts. This is done next by comparing second
moments for the US data and the model.
We simulate a discrete time economy under our original formulation of
the variety e⁄ect by shocking it by i.i.d. sunspot shocks only. For direct
comparison, the calibration remains as in Section 4 and the discount factor
is ￿ = (1+￿)￿1. To illustrate that excessive market power is not crucial to our
￿ndings, we set the steady state markup to 1:05; which is also the ￿rm level
increasing returns to scale, and calibrate its elasticity to "￿ = 0:01, which
is relatively close to its upper boundary given by the restrictions in Section
2. Since we do not have any clear estimates for the variety e⁄ects, ￿ and !;
we set them to 0:1; which is lower than the production externalities required
19by Wen (1998).17 Table 1 presents HP-￿ltered second moments of the US
data and of the arti￿cial economy. The model correctly reproduces the order
of relative volatilities and positive correlations. Persistence, measured by
the ￿rst order autoregressive process, is also well replicated. Moreover, the
markup, the number of ￿rms and, unlike in Gal￿ (1994), the investment share
are all strongly positively correlated with aggregate economic activity.18
Table 1
US data Model
Variable x ￿x=￿Y ￿(x;Y ) AR(1) ￿x=￿Y ￿(x;Y ) AR(1)
Yt 1 1 0.84 1 1 0.88
Ct 0.38 0.71 0.81 0.08 0.67 0.94
PtXt 3.62 0.97 0.78 4.50 0.99 0.88
Ht 0.84 0.83 0.90 0.95 0.99 0.88
st 2.66 0.94 0.76 3.50 0.99 0.88
Yt=Ht 0.55 0.54 0.72 0.08 0.67 0.94
Nt - - - 1.58 0.99 0.88
￿t - - - 0.04 0.99 0.88
See Appendix 8.3 for the source of US data. ￿Y denotes the standard deviation
of output and ￿(x;Y ) is the correlation of variable x and Y . Blank entries are due
to data unavailability.
7 Conclusion
Recent research suggests that markups in the US are largely procyclical or
acyclical. While this issue is clearly not settled, it puts doubt on the plau-
sibility of many endogenous business cycle models in which countercyclical
markups are the key ingredient. The current paper o⁄ers a theory that al-
lows a procyclical markup in endogenous business cycles. In fact, given a
17In the discrete time model with constant markups the required ￿ for indeterminacy is
0.1036. With ￿ = 1:05 and "￿ = 0:01 the required ￿ is 0.0797.
18The low volatility of consumption is the sole outlier with regards to the model￿ s pre-
dictions. This problem is the consequence of the additional utilization margin and has
been noted by Jaimovich (2007) and Wen (1998). We are able to show that a higher
variety e⁄ect and/or markup elasticity improves the model￿ s performance in this aspect as
it results in a steeper wage-hour locus. A shift of the ￿ at labor supply curve will produce
a smaller change in hours the steeper the wage-hour locus.
20certain level of product variety e⁄ects, a procyclical markup can make it
easier for indeterminacy to occur. Taste for variety is critical in generating
sunspot equilibria, and hence, variety matters. In comparison to many other
studies, especially where increasing returns to scale generate sunspot equi-
libria, we believe that the mechanism that drives our results is potentially
more plausible. First, the variety e⁄ect that drives this result does not imply
countercyclical marginal costs. Second, a variable markup, and in particu-
lar a procyclical markup, means that the required size of the variety e⁄ect
is signi￿cantly lower than the externalities required by many other studies.
Finally, the size of the required markups is well within empirical estimates.
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8 Appendix
8.1 Markup movements with respect to output
This Appendix shows that under indeterminacy (i) if "￿ > 0 ("￿ < 0) the
markup is procyclical (countercyclical) and (ii) the investment share, st; is
always procyclical. This is demonstrated for the model of Section 2 (to keep
notation simple; see also Figures 1 and 2); we obtain a relation between
aggregate output and the markup19
^ Yt = (1 + ￿)￿ ^ Kt +
￿
￿￿(1 + ￿)(1 ￿ ￿)
"￿[￿(1 ￿ ￿) + ￿]
+




19We set ￿ = !.
23Let us ￿rst consider the case of ￿ < ￿￿1. In (A1), for any "￿ < 0 the term in
squared bracket is negative and hence the markup is always countercyclical.




￿￿(1 + ￿)(￿ ￿ 1)(￿ ￿ 1)
[￿(1 ￿ ￿) + ￿](1 + ￿ ￿ ￿)
:
(Note that @"￿




￿￿[￿ + ￿(￿ ￿ 1)](￿ ￿ 1)
[￿(1 ￿ ￿) + ￿](1 + ￿ ￿ ￿)
which implies a positively sloped wage-hour locus. It is then easy to see that
"￿￿
￿ < "￿
￿ for any positive ￿ < ￿ ￿ 1. Next, ￿ > ￿ ￿ 1. Here indeterminacy
requires that "￿ > "￿￿
￿ : In this case, the markup is procyclical if "￿ > 0 or if
"￿ < "￿
￿ < 0: Clearly "￿￿
￿ > "￿
￿ for any ￿ > ￿￿1. Hence the markup is always
procyclical (countercyclical) under indeterminacy for any "￿ > 0 ("￿ < 0).
Lastly, from b ￿t = "￿b st, the investment share is always procyclical.
8.2 Sections 4 and 5 analytics
This Appendix presents the analytical dynamics that underlie the models
from Sections 4 and 5 respectively. With variable capital utilization, if "￿ = 0;
the determinant of J is
￿(1 ￿ ￿(1 + ￿))(￿ + ￿)(￿(1 ￿ ￿) + ￿)
￿[￿(￿(1 ￿ ￿) + ￿) ￿ ￿￿]
and the trace is governed by
￿￿2(1 + ￿)
￿￿ ￿ ￿[￿(1 ￿ ￿) + ￿]
:
If "￿ 6= 0; the determinant is
￿￿(￿ ￿ 1)[￿(1 ￿ ￿) + ￿](￿ + ￿)[1 ￿ ￿(1 + ￿)]
￿￿2 + ￿
2[￿(1 ￿ ￿) + ￿￿(￿ ￿ 1)] + ￿￿[2￿ + ￿(￿(￿ ￿ 1) ￿ ￿) ￿ ￿2(￿ ￿ 1)(1 + ￿)]
and the trace is
￿[￿￿(￿2(￿ ￿ 1)(1 + ￿) + ￿(￿ ￿ 2)) ￿ ￿￿
2(1 ￿ ￿) ￿ ￿￿2]
￿￿[￿2(￿ ￿ 1)(1 + ￿) + ￿(￿ + ￿(1 ￿ ￿)) ￿ 2￿] ￿ ￿￿2 ￿ ￿
2[￿(1 ￿ ￿) + ￿￿(￿ ￿ 1)]
24where ￿ = "￿(1 + ￿ ￿ ￿):
With the alternative formulation of the variety e⁄ect and constant capital
utilization (as used in Section 5), if "￿ = 0;the determinant of J is
(1 ￿ ￿￿)(￿ + ￿)(￿(1 ￿ ￿) + ￿)
￿[(1 ￿ ￿)￿ ￿ 1]
and the trace is given by
￿(1 ￿ ￿) ￿ ￿￿￿
(1 ￿ ￿)￿ ￿ 1
:
If "￿ 6= 0; the determinant is
￿2[￿2￿￿(￿ + "￿ ￿ 1) + "￿￿(￿ + ￿) ￿ ￿(￿(2"￿￿ + ￿ ￿ 1) + "￿￿￿)]
￿3￿
2￿(￿ + "￿ ￿ 1) + 2￿￿￿"2
￿(￿ + ￿) ￿ "2
￿￿(￿ + ￿)2 ￿ ￿3
and the trace is
￿3￿
2￿￿(￿ + "￿ ￿ 1) + 2"2
￿￿￿￿￿(￿ + ￿) ￿ "2
￿￿￿(￿ + ￿)2 + ￿4
￿3￿
2￿(￿ + "￿ ￿ 1) + 2"2
￿￿￿￿(￿ + ￿) ￿ "2
￿￿(￿ + ￿)2 ￿ ￿3
where ￿2 = ￿[(1￿￿)￿+￿](￿+￿); ￿3 = ￿2￿[￿(1+("2
￿+"￿￿2)￿+￿2)+"￿￿￿];
and ￿4 = ￿2￿[￿
2(￿ ￿ 1)2 ￿ ￿"￿￿￿(1 + "￿) ￿ "￿￿￿2]. These expressions make
obvious why we concentrated on numerical results.
8.3 Data Sources
This Appendix details the source and construction of the data used for cal-
culating US second moments in Section 6. All data is quarterly and for the
period 1948:I-2006:IV.
1. Personal Consumption Expenditures, Nondurable Goods. Seasonally
adjusted at annual rates, billions of dollars. Source: Bureau of Economic
Analysis, NIPA Table 1.1.5.
2. Personal Consumption Expenditures, Services. Seasonally adjusted at
annual rates, billions of dollars. Source: Bureau of Economic Analysis, NIPA
Table 1.1.5.
3. Gross Private Domestic Investment. Seasonally adjusted at annual
rates, billions of dollars. Source: Bureau of Economic Analysis, NIPA Table
1.1.5.
254. Gross Domestic Product. Seasonally adjusted at annual rates, billions
of dollars. Source: Bureau of Economic Analysis, NIPA Table 1.1.5.
5. Gross Domestic Product. Seasonally adjusted at annual rates, billions
of chained (2005) dollars. Source: Bureau of Economic Analysis, NIPA Table
1.1.6.
6. NonfarmBusiness Hours. Index 2005=100, seasonally adjusted. Source:
Bureau of Labor Statistics, Series Id: PRS85006033.
7. Civilian Noninstitutional Population. 16 years and over, thousands.
Source: Bureau of Labor Statistics, Series Id: LNU00000000Q.
8. GDP De￿ ator = (4)=(5):
9. Real Per Capita Consumption, Ct = [(1) + (2)]=(8)=(7):
10. Real Per Capita Investment, PtXt = (3)=(8)=(7):
11. Real Per Capita Output, Yt = (9) + (10):
12. Per Capita Hours Worked, Ht = (6)=(7):
13. Investment Share, st = (10)=(11):
14. Labor Productivity, Yt=Ht = (11)=(12):
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